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NANCY J .  KING 
Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA 
The Supreme Court in Missouri v. Frye1 and Lafler v. Cooper2 broke new 
ground by holding for the first time that a defendant’s right to the effective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment can be violated by the loss of 
a favorable plea deal. Less noted, but also worthy of attention, are Lafler’s 
implications for federal habeas law. Four Justices protested that the Lafler 
decision violated the federal habeas statute. At the least, the decision expanded 
habeas review in unexpected ways. 
Lafler presented the Supreme Court with an unusual opportunity to declare 
new doctrine on habeas review. First, the State had conceded that the 
performance of respondent Anthony Cooper’s lawyer was deficient under the 
first prong of Strickland v. Washington3—a point not easily demonstrated in 
most habeas cases because of the deference afforded strategic decisions.4 
Second, the Court managed to avoid what would have been a difficult hurdle 
for the petitioner to clear in seeking relief under § 2254(d)(1), the provision of 
the habeas statute that conditions relief upon a showing that the state decision 
was either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”5 The state court’s vague wording allowed the Court to characterize the 
state decision as “contrary to” Strickland and to bypass the issue of whether it 
was an “unreasonable application” of Strickland. 
 
1.  No. 10-444 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-444.pdf 
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1399). 
2.  No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-209.pdf 
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1376). 
3.  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
4.  See id. at 689-91. 
5.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
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The Court’s opinion in Lafler turned on the following two paragraphs of 
the state court decision: 
 
To establish ineffective assistance, the defendant must 
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s representation so 
prejudiced the defendant that he was deprived of a fair trial. With 
respect to the prejudice aspect of the test, the defendant must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 
the result of the proceedings would have been different, and that the 
attendant proceedings were fundamentally unfair and unreliable. 
Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding . . . that defense 
counsel provided effective assistance to defendant during the plea 
bargaining process. He contends that defense counsel failed to 
convey the benefits of the plea offer to him and ignored his desire to 
plead guilty, and that these failures led him to reject a plea offer that 
he now wishes to accept. However, the record shows that defendant 
knowingly and intelligently rejected two plea offers and chose to go 
to trial. The record fails to support defendant’s contentions that 
defense counsel’s representation was ineffective because he rejected a 
defense based on [a] claim of self-defense and because he did not 
obtain a more favorable plea bargain for defendant.6 
 
The five Justices in the Lafler majority concluded that this decision was 
“contrary to” Strickland, because in their view it failed entirely to apply the 
case: “Rather than applying Strickland, the state court simply found that 
respondent’s rejection of the plea was knowing and voluntary. An inquiry into 
whether the rejection of a plea is knowing and voluntary, however, is not the 
correct means by which to address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”7 
The state court, in the majority’s view, “applie[d] a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.”8 
By contrast, the four dissenting Justices read the second paragraph of the 
state court’s analysis as that court’s application of the Strickland standard. The 
state court’s statement that “defendant knowingly and intelligently rejected 
 
6.  People v. Cooper, No. 250583, 2005 WL 599740, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2005) 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
7.  Lafler, slip op. at 14-15 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
8.  Id. at 14 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (opinion of O’Connor, J.)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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two plea offers and chose to go to trial,” the dissenters explained, “can be 
regarded as a denial that there was anything ‘fundamentally unfair’ about 
Cooper’s conviction and sentence, so that no Strickland prejudice had been 
shown.”9 Because it referenced and applied the correct test, they reasoned, the 
decision was not contrary to established federal law. Furthermore, this opinion 
was not an “unreasonable application[] of clearly established law,” the 
dissenters argued, “since this Court has never held that a defendant in Cooper’s 
position can establish Strickland prejudice.”10 
Had the state court used language more easily read as rejecting Cooper’s 
claim under Strickland’s prejudice standard, the majority would not have had 
the option of characterizing the state decision as “contrary to” Strickland.11 
Instead, the Court would have had to explain why the state decision was an 
unreasonable application of Strickland. And under that standard, Cooper would 
have lost. It would have been reasonable, before Lafler, for a state court to 
decide that it was not “prejudice” under Strickland to end up with a fair trial 
and legal sentence after missing out on a more favorable plea deal because of 
counsel’s incompetence. No decision of the Supreme Court had held that the 
Sixth Amendment protected defendants from losing plea deals, as opposed to 
fair trials, sentencing proceedings, or appeals,12 and several of the Court’s 
decisions had pointed in the other direction.13 
 
9.  Id. at 9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
10.  Id. at 10. 
11.  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“Assume, for example, that a state-
court decision on a prisoner’s ineffective-assistance claim correctly identifies Strickland as 
the controlling legal authority and, applying that framework, rejects the prisoner’s claim. 
Quite clearly, the state-court decision would be in accord with our decision in Strickland as 
to the legal prerequisites for establishing an ineffective-assistance claim [and thus would not 
be “contrary to” Strickland] even assuming the federal court considering the prisoner’s 
habeas application might reach a different result applying the Strickland framework itself.”). 
12.  It takes a holding by the Supreme Court to clearly establish federal law under § 2254(d). See 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (requiring the “clearly established federal law” be 
“determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); see also Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. 
Ct. 1171, 1175 (2010) (“[N]o decision of this Court clearly establishes the categorical rule on 
which the Court of Appeals appears to have relied.”); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 
122 (2009) (“With no Supreme Court precedent establishing a ‘nothing to lose’ standard for 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, habeas relief cannot be granted pursuant to 
§ 2254(d)(1) based on such a standard.”); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) 
(“No decision of this Court, however, squarely addresses the issue in this case or clearly 
establishes [a new standard] in this novel factual context.” (citation omitted)). 
13.  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-93; Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-372 (1993); Nix v. 
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 186-87 (1986); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). 
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Consider, by contrast, what would have happened had the Court decided to 
review a federal habeas challenge to a state decision in which the state court 
rejected a claim like Cooper’s, but had more clearly relied on Strickland in its 
reasoning and interpreted Strickland as did the Lafler dissenters. In order to 
grant habeas relief in such a case, the Court first would have had to conclude 
that the position held by four Justices (assuming Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas would have taken the same position on the 
merits of the Sixth Amendment question), a unanimous Utah Supreme 
Court,14 and at least four court of appeals judges,15 was “unreasonable” under 
§ 2254(d)—that is, “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.”16 Not likely. 
Indeed, a petitioner who had challenged a state court decision that said 
virtually nothing except “denied,” after a bare citation of the correct Supreme 
Court precedent, would have had a much more difficult time than Cooper did 
convincing a federal court that the decision was “contrary to” established 
federal law, and would instead have had to meet Richter’s exacting 
“unreasonable application” standard. As the Court explained in Richter, 
“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the 
habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable 
basis for the state court to deny relief.”17 In short, but for the unusual combination 
of ambiguous reasoning by the state court and admitted incompetence in 
Lafler, the Supreme Court probably would have had to save its development of 
the constitutional regulation of representation during the plea process for a 
different case—an appeal of either a state postconviction decision (like Frye and 
 
14.  State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1189 (Utah 2007) (concluding that “a fair trial for the 
defendant generally negates the possibility of prejudice” under Strickland). 
15.  See Williams v. Jones, 583 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“[N]o decision from the United States Supreme Court has ever held (or 
even hinted) that a lawyer’s bad advice to reject a plea offer gives rise to a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment, or any other provision of federal law. Neither does a conventional 
Strickland analysis compel such a novel result.”). The Seventh Circuit also appeared to 
anticipate that the question was a close one. See Kerr v. Thurmer, 639 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 
2011) (“We think it best to move forward now, recognizing that if the Court rules that the 
later trial erases any possible claim relating to potential plea bargains, then it is likely that 
Kerr’s case will have to be dismissed at that time.”), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1791 (remanding the 
case for further consideration in light of Lafler). 
16.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011). 
17.  Id. at 777 (emphasis added). 
 lafler v. cooper and aedpa 
33 
 
Padilla v. Kentucky18) or a decision under § 2255,19 where the “unreasonable 
application” standard of § 2254(d) would not apply. 
On its face, Lafler’s “contrary to” analysis leaves the daunting 
“unreasonable application” standard of Richter in place—both decisions were 
authored by Justice Kennedy, and the Court carefully avoided discussion of the 
“unreasonable application” standard. But the decision in Lafler appears to have 
loosened the “contrary to” standard a notch for future cases, encouraging 
petitioners to argue that the state court never applied the correct federal 
precedent (even when that precedent is cited or described), instead of arguing 
than that the court’s application of federal law was unreasonable. The 
combination of Lafler and Richter also suggests that when reviewing state court 
criminal opinions, “less is more”—a summary state denial will not be disturbed 
unless all possible (hypothetical) applications would have been unreasonable, 
while a merits decision accompanied by an ambiguously phrased rationale that 
could be construed as failing to apply the correct rule is vulnerable to attack.20 
The best news for prisoners bringing Frye and Lafler claims from now on, 
however, is that by announcing its interpretation of Strickland in a federal 
habeas case, the Court in Lafler necessarily applied that rule retroactively. 
Generally the habeas remedy is limited to violations of federal law that were 
clearly established at the time the state court denied relief to the petitioner; 
retroactive enforcement of new rules announced only later is prohibited.21 This 
means that any controversial decision for defendants announced by the 
Supreme Court on appeal is inevitably followed by a battle over whether that 
decision was clearly established by earlier Supreme Court precedent and thus is 
available as a basis for relief for any habeas petitioner whose state court 
decision postdated that earlier Supreme Court precedent. For example, when 
the Court in Padilla announced the qualified Sixth Amendment right to 
competent pre-plea advice concerning deportation, it did so in an appeal from a 
 
18.  130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
19.  28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (governing collateral review of convictions of federal prisoners). 
20.  I do not mean to suggest here that Lafler will actually prompt more state courts to “withhold 
explanations for their decisions.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. I agree with the Richter Court that 
“[o]pinion-writing practices in state courts are influenced by considerations other than 
avoiding scrutiny by collateral attack in federal court.” Id. 
21.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (prohibiting relief from a state decision that rejected the merits of 
a federal claim unless the decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (permitting no 
retroactive application of “new rules” of constitutional criminal procedure, with two narrow 
exceptions). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. 
KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2011). 
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state postconviction decision, not in a federal habeas case.22 Lower courts soon 
divided over whether or not that rule was clearly established by either 
Strickland or Hill before the Padilla decision23 and the Court has now agreed to 
resolve the issue in its upcoming term.24 The same sort of litigation followed 
the Court’s decisions in Crawford v. Washington25 and Ring v. Arizona.26 
By affirming the grant of habeas relief for Cooper under § 2254(d), the 
Court appears to have assumed that its foregone-plea doctrine was “clearly 
established” at least as far back as 2005, when the Michigan Court of Appeals 
rejected Cooper’s claim of ineffective assistance. That is undoubtedly 
surprising news to the divided judges of the Tenth Circuit, to the justices of the 
Utah Supreme Court, and to those who believed that under § 2254(d), habeas 
corpus would “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice 
systems,” not “substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”27 But it 
is welcome news for any petitioner whose foregone-plea claim was rejected by 
a state court in the past seven years. 
 
Nancy J. King is the Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law at Vanderbilt 
University Law School. 
 
Preferred citation: Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 29 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/06/19/king.html. 
 
22.  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
23.  See, e.g., Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on 
Defendants’ Ability To Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 965-75 (2012). 
24.  See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 1468539 
(U.S. Apr. 30, 2012) (No. 11-820). 
25.  See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (holding Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), to not 
be retroactive). 
26.  See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (refusing to find that the rule of Ring, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002), entitling a defendant to a jury determination of facts that state law requires 
must be found before a death sentence may be imposed, would fit within an exception to 
Teague). The Court has yet to address whether the rule in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004), applies retroactively. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (declining to 
reach the question). 
27.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
